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RECENT STATE WIRETAP STATUTES: DEFICIENCIES OF
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT CORRECTED
SECTION 605 of the Federal Communications Act criminally proscribes un-
authorized interception and divulgence of telephone communications., Al-
though devitalized by lax enforcement and tenuous judicial construction, this
section has been the major curb on wiretap activity since its enactment in
1934.2 State legislatures, reluctant to renounce an effective police technique,
1. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952). This section is the first federal
statute seeking to regulate wiretapping on a permanent basis. At common law, eaves-
dropping was an indictable offense. 2 WHARTON, CI-MiNA LAw § 1718 (12th ed. 1932).
But prior to § 605, the only federal attempt to prohibit wiretapping was a World War I
statute which expired on governmental restoration of seized telephone and telegraph
companies. Act of Oct. 29, 1918, c. 197, 40 STAT. 1017. From 1918 to 1934, federal wire-
tap policies were determined solely by the Attorney General and changed with appoint-
ments. See Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE
L.J. 799 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Donnelly, Comments and Caveats) ; Rogers, The
Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954). On the particular needs to which the
Communications Act was a response, see Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104 &
n.14 (1957).
The consent of the sender will validate interception and divulgence. 48 STAT. 1103
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952) ; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 1.14, 121 (1942) ;
United States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941). Normally, each party to a call is
both sender and receiver. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940) ; United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 84 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (contrary authority collected and rejected). But see Rathbun v. United States,
355 U.S. 106 (1957). But a receiver who answers without referring to the sender's mes-
sage or without speaking at all may not be a sender. People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137
P.2d 1, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 715 (1942).
Interception and divulgence may also be valid if effected to administer other sections
of the act. See 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952) ; cf. United States v. Sug-
den, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir.), aff'd per euriam, 351 U.S. 916 (1955) (permissible to moni-
tor radio station to prevent unauthorized operation).
To protect both parties, the Federal Communications Commission requires that all
interstate tapping be accompanied by regular tone warnings. Use of Recording Device.
in Connection With Telephone Service, Order of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Docket No. 6787, May 20, 1948. But this requirement has often been disregarded.
Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUIm.
L. REv. 165, 184 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Westin, Analysis and Proposal) ; cf. United
States v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 223 F.2d 336 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
2. Only one prosecution has been brought under § 605 in the past twenty-four years.
See United States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1941.). See also Donnelly, Comments and Caveats, at 802. The arrest of Gruber, a private
citizen, occurred during a brief period in 1941 when the Justice Department adopted a
strict view of the act. Fairfield & Clift, The Wiretappers, Reporter Magazine, Dec. 23,
1952, p. 12. Presumably, the section is not enforced because the Justice Department
refuses to prosecute others for acts it performs regularly. Westin, Analysis and Proposal,
at 169 & n.18, 179; see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (dissenting opinion;
unreasonable to expect district attorney to prosecute associates for violation of Fourth
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have generally prohibited wiretapping only to the extent that it constitutes
malicious mischief.3 Moreover, most states, even those with specific wiretap-
Amendment on search which he authorized) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 759
(1952) (dissenting opinion); POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTI cE IN AmERICA 186 (1930). Despite
these flaws, § 605 is stronger than most state wiretap statutes, see note 3 infra, and more
effectively regulates the use of wiretap information, see notes 4, 14 infra.
In the absence of effective federal or state sanctions, wiretapping is a widespread
practice. Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Government Employees,"
58 YALE L.J. 401, 405 (1949) ; Westin, Analysis and Proposal, at 165-72 & n.5; Note, 61
YALE L.J. 1221 (1952). See also N.Y. Times, March 10, 1958, § L, p. 3, cols. 5-6 (wire-
tapping of reporters to discover leaks of government secrets to the press); Westin,
Analysis and Proposal, at 187 & n.107 (wiretapping in wartime). On the prevalence of
private tapping, see JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE To STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATioNS, REPORT 26-29 (N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 53, March 1956) (herein-
after cited as N.Y. LEGISLATIVE REPORT). The assistance rendered government agents by
telephone companies contributes to the frequency of wiretapping. See Hearings Before a
Subcomnittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce Pursuant to S. Res. 224,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. passim (1940).
Despite the amount of current tapping, advocates of increased safeguards for national
security emphasize the need for more wiretapping and less restriction. 'See Rogers, supra
note 1, at 793; N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1957, § E, p. 7, cols. 1-4; 8 WIGMORE, EVEN c
§ 2184b (3d ed. 1940) ; Westin, Analysis and Proposal, at 175 & n.55 (collecting articles) ;
cf. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H.J. Res. 283, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1942) (remarks of Representative Hobbs). But
Congress has been unable to agree on less stringent wiretap controls. Westin, Analysis
and Proposal, at 181 & n.72; LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
323-26 (1950) ; cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1958, p. 1, cols. 3-4 (proposed law to overturn
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957)).
For judicial constructions which have weakened the effect of § 605, see notes 9, 14
infra. See also Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 514, 518-23
(1947) ; Westin, Analysis and Proposal, at 178-1; Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1957,
p. 8, cols. 1-2.
3. Only five states, including Pennsylvania and Illinois, see note 5 infra, expressly
prohibit interception and disclosure. Of the nineteen states which have specific wiretap
prohibitions, statutes or case law in five authorize police tapping, and the question is un-
settled in four. Four other states have no statutory provision whatever. Another has an
eavesdropping act; and four more forbid only divulgence by employees of communications
companies. The remaining fifteen states simply rely on malicious mischief laws. Three
of these laws expressly prohibit telephone companies from disclosing messages, and three
apply only to telegraph messages. These malicious mischief statutes are totally inade-
quate to control wiretapping, since they only prohibit damage to utilities and equipment.
N.Y. LEGISLATIVE REPORT app. B, 54-71; Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 71, 74 & nn.178-82 (1947).
The recently enacted Oregon wiretap act, forbidding interception by any device without
the consent of one participant, bears strong resemblance, particularly in its definitional
sections, to the model act proposed by Professor Westin. The major difference is the
Oregon law's failure specifically to proscribe divulgence. Compare OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 165.535, 165.540 (1955), with Westin, Analysis and Proposal, at 200-08. For an ex-
ample of the different results under similar state tapping statutes, see id. at 183-84 (Cali-
fornia and New York disagree on right of subscriber to tap his own wire).
For the view that states adopt more effective protections against wiretapping because
of an increased concern with personal, nonproperty rights, see Rosenzweig, supra at 74.
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ping prohibitions, not only fail to prosecute offenders but admit illegally ob-
tained communications in evidence. 4 Recent adoption by Pennsylvania and
Illinois of wiretap legislation broader and more stringent than section 605,
however, forecasts a conflict between federal and state interests disrupting the
existing regulatory pattern.
4. Of the thirty-three states admitting wiretap evidence, thirteen have statutes making
wiretapping illegal. In twelve jurisdictions illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible, and
in three the issue remains unresolved. N.Y. LEolsILrTIvE REPORT app. B, 54-71. A recent
Texas law providing that all evidence obtained in violation of § 605 is inadmissible in
Texas courts, TEXAS CODE CRI.M. PRoc. art. 727A (Supp. 1954), is the only state utiliza-
tion of that section as a standard of admissibility.
State prosecutions for wiretapping were rare before 1947, see Rosenzweig, supra note
3, at 75, and since then none has been reported.
5. The Illinois statute reads in part:
"Section 1. For the purposes of this Act:
"'Electronic eavesdropping' means the use of any device employing electricity to hear
or record, or both, all or any part of any oral conversation . . . without consent of any
party thereto, whether such conversation is conducted in person or by telephone ....
"'Person' means any individual, firm or corporation, including but not by way of
limitation, any law enforcement officer of this state or any municipality or other political
subdivision thereof, or of the United States, whether or not within the course of his
employment.
"'Eavesdropper' means any individual who operates or helps or participates in the
operation of any device used in electronic eavesdropping.
"'Principal' means any person who employs another who, to the knowledge of the
employer, used electronic eavesdropping in the course of such employment, or any person
who knowingly derives any benefit or information by virtue of the electronic eavesdropping
of another, or who directs another to use electronic eavesdropping on his behalf.
"Section 2. Electronic eavesdropping is prohibited and any violation of this Act is a
misdemeanor and any person convicted thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or, if an individual, sentenced to not less thail
ten days nor more than one year in the county jail or both.
"Section 3. Any or all parties to any conversation upon which electronic eavesdropping
is practiced contrary to this Act shall have the following rights:
"(a) To an injunction by any court of competent jurisdiction prohibiting further
electronic eavesdropping by the individual eavesdropper and by or on behalf of his prin-
cipal, or either.
"(b) To all actual damages against the eavesdropper or his principal or both.
"(c) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the court or by a jury.
"(d) To all actual damages against any landlord, owner or building operator, or any
common carrier by wire who aids, abets or knowingly permits the electronic eavesdrop-
ping concerned.
"(e) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the court or by a jury against
any landlord, owner or building operator, or common carrier by wire who aids, abets or
knowingly permits the electronic eavesdropping concerned.
"(f) Any evidence obtained in violation of this Act is not admissible in any civil or
criminal trial, or any administrative or legislative inquiry or proceeding, nor in any grand
jury proceedings.
"Section 4. Any person who uses or divulges any information which he knows or
reasonably should know was obtained by illegal electronic eavesdropping shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to the penalties for violation of this Act provided
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The Pennsylvania and Illinois acts are apparently designed to remedy the
ineffectual wiretap control of section 605.0 While lower federal courts have
consistently construed the federal act to prohibit only interception coupled
with divulgence,7 the state laws further condemn interception alone.8 Similar-
in Section 2 and shall be subject to damages and other remedies provided in Section 3 of
this Act.
"Section 6. This Act shall be deemed severable and if any section, paragraph, sentence
or part thereof ever be held invalid or unenforceable, such decision shall not in any way
affect the remaining portions of this Act." Illinois House Bill #1210, reported June 19,
1957. Although the Illinois act became law in 1957, a formal citation is unavailable. Its
passage is reported in American Civil Liberties Union Weekly Bulletin, No. 1918, Oct. 7,
1957, p. 2.
The Pennsylvania act provides in part:
"No person shall intercept a communication by telephone or telegraph without
permission of the parties to such communication. No person shall install or employ
any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a telephone or
telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in violation of this act. No person
shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication intercepted in violation
of this act. Whoever wilfully violates or aids, abets or procures a violation of this act
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable by imprisonment of not more than one
year, or by fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5000), or both, and shall be liable
to any person whose communication is unlawfully intercepted or divulged for treble the
amount of any damage resulting from such unlawful interception, divulgence or use, but
in no event less than one hundred dollars ($100) and a reasonable attorney's fee. The
term 'person' includes natural persons, business associations, partnerships, corporations,
or other legal entities, and persons acting or purporting to act for, or in behalf of, any
government or subdivision thereof, whether Federal, State or local. The term 'divulge'
includes divulgence to a fellow employe [sic] or official in government or private enterprise
or in a judicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding. Except as proof in a
suit or prosecution for a violation of this act, no evidence obtained as a result of an un-
lawful interception shall be admissible in any such proceeding . . " PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2443 (Supp. 1957).
6. These laws are specifically applicable to federal agents; they clearly prohibit inter-
ception itself; they provide civil remedies against wiretappers; and they expressly declare
wiretap evidence inadmissible. In each state, previous wiretapping laws were patently in-
adequate. Illinois had only a malicious mischief statute coupled with a proscription against
tapping for otherwise illegal purposes such as bribery or blackmail. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch.
134, §§ 15(a), 16 (Smith-Hurd 1936). And Pennsylvania prohibited only malicious mis-
chief and divulgence by company employees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4688, 4916 (1939).
Moreover, the Pennsylvania supreme court held § 605 inapplicable to state officers acting
in connection with state crimes or divulging to state courts. Commonwealth v. Chaitt,
380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955).
7. The Attorney General announced conjunctive reading of § 605 in a letter to the
House Judiciary Committee. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Com-
nittee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941). This
interpretation has frequently been criticized. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2700, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1950) ; Donnelly, Comments and Caveats, at 800-03. The Treasury Department,
in contrast, at least says that interception is itself prohibited. Id. at 802 & n.18. Never-
theless, lower federal courts have accepted the Justice Department's reading of § 605. See
United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1951) ; United States v. Sullivan, 1.16
1958]
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ly, section 605 is generally restricted to devices requiring physical contact with
the telephone system, 9 but interception under the state statutes comprehends
any electronic eavesdropping.10 And where the federal law permits tapping if
authorized by the sender," the state acts require the consent of both parties
to the communication.' 2 In addition, the Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes
are specifically applicable to federal as well as state officers.13
Prosecution of United States officers under the Pennsylvania and Illinois
laws would curtail current federal uses of illegally obtained wiretap informa-
F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953) : United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1941),
aff'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (dictum). But the Supreme Court has care-
fully avoided ruling on the question. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 n.5
(1957) ; Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 108 & n.3 (1957). This reticence has
only given permissive effect to the justice department interpretation. One commentator
suggests that the Court's indecision is based on its inability to decide on a solution to the
dilemma of wiretapping. Westin, Antalysis and Proposal, at 179.
8. See statutes quoted note 5 supra.
9. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detectaphone against wall of
room in which conversation occurred not interception) ; Rayson v. United States, 238
F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956) (listening on extension of receiver's phone not interception);
Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (listening from adjoining room by means
of mechanical device not interception) ; Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C.
Cir.), reversing on other grounds United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1950)
(no interception where federal agent answered phone and took message in gambling estab-
lishment) ; United States v. Guller, 101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (interception must
be accomplished by some apparatus interposed in transmitting mechanism) ; cf. United
States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1939). But see United States v.
Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940) (interception present
when any person listens to telephone call without consent of both conversants) ; United
States v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941) (same) ; United States v. Stephenson, 121
F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 223 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (same) ; Reit-
meister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (existing lead from main wire no
different from tap into wire); United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(use of microphone is interception whether it touched or was only near phone) ; United
States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Note, 53 MIcH. L. Rzv. 623 (1955).
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (refusal to allow indirect
circumvention of § 605).
Similar technical distinctions are drawn in state cases. See California v. falotte, 46
Cal. 2d 59, 292 P.2d 517 (1956) (recording conversation by induction coil operating at
receiver's telephone not interception) ; California v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435, 308
P.2d 821 (1957) (no interception where police officer listened to amplifier attached to
receiver by extension cord). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184c (Supp. 1957) (use
of amplifier and dictaphone approved).
The definition which requires physical contact with the telephone system has been
criticized as confusing, impractical and obsolescent. See Westin, Analysis and Proposal,
at 197-200 (including analysis of different mechanisms employed) ; Mellin, I Was a Wire
Tapper, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 10, 1949, p. 57; cf. Berger, Tapping the Wires,
The New Yorker, June 18, 1938, p. 41.
10. See statutes quoted note 5 supra.
11. See note 1 supra.




tion. Although generally neither admitted in the federal courts nor allowed as
a lead to admissible evidence, 14 such information has been utilized to encourage
confessions, 1 to refresh a witness's recollection before he testifies, 16 and
against any person not a party to the communication.17 But even such accepted
uses of wiretap information constitute illegal divulgence. 18 Nevertheless, no
federal officer has ever been prosecuted for violation of section 605.19 Further-
more, since 1941 the Department of Justice, considering itself a unity for such
14. Before § 605, evidence obtained by wiretapping was admissible in the federal
courts. See Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Foley v. United
States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933) ; Kerns v. United States,
50 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1931).
Even after enactment of the Communications Act, wiretap evidence was admitted in
the federal courts. Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 655 (1936). However, in 1938 the Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction
because the prosecution's evidence was illegally obtained by wiretapping. Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Subsequently, it extended this application of § 605
to evidence procured through knowledge gained from wiretapping, Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and to intrastate as well as interstate communications, Weiss
v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). The admissibility of illegal evidence in state courts
is a matter of state law despite the federal bar. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1,949).
Only in 1957 did the Court finally proscribe the use in federal courts of evidence obtained
by state officials in violation of § 605. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
The Nardone cases have been sharply criticized as judicial legislation. See, e.g., Notes,
6 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 326 (1938), 53 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1940), 34 ILL L. REv. 758
(1940), 16 TEXAS L. REv. 574 (1938), 86 U. PA. L. Rz-v. 436 (1938). But over twenty
years of unsuccessful congressional attempts to amend the statute add strength to the
Court's construction. See note 7 supra. And states can still use or prohibit wiretap evi-
dence in their courts as they choose. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
The exclusion of "tainted" evidence evokes the serious problem of distinguishing evi-
dence produced by wiretapping from evidence otherwise procured. See, Rosenzweig, sujpra
note 2, at 540. The burden of proof on the party seeking to exclude wiretap evidence is
considerable, see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952), since the mere fact of tapping will not
taint evidence, Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952). Consequently, some courts shift the burden to the prosecution. See United
States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
15. Coplon v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
16. See Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
873 (1956).
17. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), affirming 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.
1941). The Court based its holding on the doctrine permitting thle introduction in federal
courts of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure so long as the defendant is
not the subject of the illegal search. Id. at 121 & n.12. See also Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). But see Goldstein v. United States, supra at 127 (dissenting opinion;
analogy to search and seizure unwarranted since rule against inadmissibility is "not a
remedy for the sender ... [but] the obedient answer to the Congressional command that
society shall not be plagued with such practices as wire-tapping") ; cf. Comment, 57 CoLum.
L. R v. 1159, 1161 n.30 (1957).
18. See Goldstein v. United States, supra note 17; United States v. White, 228 F.2d
832 (7th Cir. 1956); State v. Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168, cert. denied, 340
U.S. 850 (1950).
19. See note 2 supra.
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purposes, has consistently declared that divulgence to a superior within the
department is not illegal.20 Vigorous application of the state acts, disallowing
interception unaccompanied by divulgence, would jeopardize these long-estab-
lished federal practices.
Enforcement of the state statutes against federal officers, however, may be
unconstitutional. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
precludes state regulation of federal instrumentalities acting in pursuance of
valid federal law.21 Thus geared to federal authority, the clause would not
block state prosecution of a federal agent who violated both section 605 and
a state wiretap statute.22 When the tapping condemned by state law was legal
20. This view was first enunciated by Attorney General Biddle. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1941, p. 4, col. 2; see Donnelly, Comments and Caveats, at 801. For the circumstances
surrounding this declaration, see Fairfield & Clift, supra note 2, p. 13.
The Department has also declared that § 605 was only intended to eliminate use of
illegal wiretapping information for personal gain, not aid of law enforcement. Although
the majority of the Court in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), refused to
rule on this contention, id. at 122, the dissent emphatically rejected it, id. at 125.
21. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2; PUC v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 446 (1958);
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 & n.5 (1943) (disallowing inspection fees im-
posed by state on federally owned and distributed fertilizer; collecting cases) ; Pacific
Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 294 & nn.1l-13 (1943) (col-
lecting cases) ; DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229-32 (5th ed. 1954) (collecting
cases). For collection and analysis of earlier cases, see Powell, Supreme Court Decisions
on the Commerce Clause and State Police Power 1910-1914, 21 COLUm. L. REv. 737, 22
id. at 133 (1921-22).
22. A federal officer acting under color of authority or in pursuit of his duties is not
immune from conviction for violation of state law if his conduct also contravenes the
laws of the United States. See Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56 (1920) (dictum);
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899) (dictum) ; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 68, 75
(1890) (dictum); United States v. Hart, 1 Peters' Cir. Ct. 390 (1817) (dictum); Ob-
struction of Mail Carriers, 5 Os. ArT''Y GEN. 554, 555-56 (1852). Alleged action under
color of authority, however, will justify removal of a state prosecution of a federal agent
from a state to a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1952) ; MooRE, JUDICIAL CODE 253-57
(1949) ; Ex parte Shockley, 17 F.2d 133, 137 (N.D. Ohio 1926) (collecting cases) ; Nor-
folk v. McFarland, 143 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Va. 1956) ; Colorado v. Maxwell, 125 F. Supp.
18 (D. Colo. 1954) ; Logemann v. Stock, 81 F. Supp. 337 (D. Neb. 1949); Potts v. Elliott,
61 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1945). See also Ex parte Dierks, 55 F.2d 371 (D. Colo. 1932).
For a thorough historical appraisal of the removal process, see Strayhorn, The Iniunty
of Federal Officers From State Prosecutions, 6 N.C.L. REv. 124 (1927).
Prosecutions transferred to the federal district court under § 1442 proceed as if in the
state court from which removed. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) ; Atlantic
C.L.R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914); Strayhorn, supra at 134. See also Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922) (where both federal and state governments have criminal
charges against individual, whichever exercises jurisdiction first continues action to com-
pletion).
Removal presumably avoids a possibly hostile state forum. Gordon v. Longest, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 63 (1842) ; Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal
Officers, 9 CoLum. L. REv. 397 (1909) ; Crimmins, Reiwval of Indictments by Federal
Officers as an Invasion of States' Rights, 9 NoTRE DAirri LAW. 354 (1933). For criticism
of this purpose and its effects, see Strayhorn, supra at 145.
[Vol. 67
NOTES
under the federal act, on the other hand, application of the state statute would
be unconstitutional. 23 Construing state law as inapplicable to federal officers
acting legally by federal standards would avoid invalidation of those sections
specifically directed against federal agents. Although such construction by the
state courts would bind federal judges, 24 the explicit and unconfined applica-
bility of the Pennsylvania and Illinois acts to United States officers may render
a similar federal interpretation difficult in the absence of prior state warrant.2 5
A recent Supreme Court decision, moreover, may be interpreted to hold that
section 605 excludes all state wiretapping regulation. Benanti v. United States
prohibited the use in federal courts of wiretap evidence obtained by New York
state agents in compliance with New York law.2 6 Since section 605 is appli-
cable to both interstate and intrastate communications,2 7 the Court reasoned,
23. See Johnson v. Maryland, mepra note 22; Ohio v. Thomas, supra note 22; In. re
Neagle, mipra note 22.
24. Minnesota ex tel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 273 (1940) (inter-
pretation of Minnesota psychopathic offender statute by the highest state court binds the
Supreme Court; collecting cases).
25. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (Los Angeles convicted-felon
registration ordinance unconstitutional since willfullness not an element of violation either
by terms or by construction).
Since prosecution of a federal officer under either state statute would be immediately
removable to the federal courts, see note 22 supra, obtaining prior state declaration of in-
applicability to federal officers who have not violated § 605 may necessitate resort to an
action for declaratory judgment by a state officer ordered to engage in wiretap activity.
The Illinois Declaratory Judgments Act specifically approves construing state laws when
an actual controversy exists. ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 110, § 57.1 (Smith-Hurd 1957). Illinois
courts have rendered declaratory judgments where rights are or are about to be affected
by a statute's enforcement. Note, 33 ILL. L. Rm. 478, 480 (1938) (collecting cases). See,
generally, United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (disallowing federal
declaratory judgment because threatened enforcement of state law for violation not speci-
fically alleged). Pennsylvania has adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, PA.
STAv. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 831-46 (Supp. 1957), which does not specifically provide for statutory
construction. Case law has, however, permitted it. See Taylor v. Haverford Township,
299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930). But Pennsylvania courts also dismiss declaratory actions
which constitute no more than requests for advisory opinions. See Reese v. Adamson.
297 Pa. 13, 146 Atl. 262 (1929) ; Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 Atl. 274 (1928). An
actual controversy between a state officer ordered to tap in violation of state law and the
state attorney general could thus satisfy statute and precedents in both Pennsylvania and
Illinois.
26. 355 U.S. 96 (1957). Positing the exclusionary rule as only a sanction against
overzealous enforcement of federal laws, the Second Circuit had admitted the wiretap
evidence obtained by state officers without intent to transfer it to federal agents. United
States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389, 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1957) ; see Comment, 57 CoLum. L. Rv.
1159 (1957) (approving the unequivocality of the holding though questioning the result) ;
106 U. PA. L. Ray. 314 (1957); 43 VA. L. Ray. 944 (1957) (approving the decision's
consistency with existing law).
27. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) ; Massengale v. United States, 240
F.2d 781, 782 (6th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956) ;
United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 351 U.S. 916
(1956) ; United States v. Lipinski, 151 F. Supp. 145 (D.N.M. 1957) ; United States v. Gris,
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Congress can clearly proscribe all state-authorized wiretapping.28 Unless the
federal act is so construed, it continued, New York law would jeopardize the
protection afforded by Congress. 29 The Court also found that Congress did
not intend to permit state law to "contradict" section 605 or its policy.20 Read
literally, this assertion could imperil state laws extending protection from
wiretapping beyond the federal statute. But since the tenor of the opinion is
otherwise confined to preserving the safeguards adopted by federal law, such
an implication was probably unintended.
Traditional criteria for determining congressional intent to pre-empt fields
otherwise subject to state regulation also suggest that section 605 does not
bar the Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes. Before such intent is found, a com-
prehensive scheme of federal control linked with a dominant federal interest
must be established.31 Although the Communications Act embraces both the
146 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Presumably, the indiscriminate nature of wiretapping
precludes separating interstate from intrastate communications. See Westin, Analysis and
Proposal, at 176.
28. 355 U.S. at 105; it re Interception of Telephone Communications, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 2331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 1958) ; Burack v. State Liquor Authority, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 1147 (E.D.N.Y. March 12, 1958); see N.Y. World-Telegram & Sun, April 11, 1958,
p. 30, cols. 1-4; cf. Weiss v. United States, supra note 27, at 328-29.
29. 355 U.S. at 104-05.
30. Id. at 105-06: "Congress ... did not mean to allow state legislation which would
contradict that section [605] and that policy." Certainty as to the underlying policy of
§ 605 is not easily achieved. Eight years after its enactment, the Court stated that the
section was designed to protect the means rather than secrecy of communication. Gold-
man v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942). This view parallels statements that the
purpose of the Communications Act was to extend the jurisdiction of the existing Radio
Commission to telecommunications. See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 328 (1939) ;
H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 8822 (1934). But
popular concern was with the intrusion on privacy which Mr. Justice Brandeis had depicted
in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). For a thorough
survey of newspaper opinion in the early postwar years, see Westin, Analysis and Pro-
posal, at 189-92. Lower federal courts have reflected this concern by stating that § 605
was intended to safeguard the individual. United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957) ; United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1950). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the "protection of the system" position. See Rathbun
v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
31. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-31 (1947); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 & Tn. 18 & 19 (1941) (collecting cases) ; United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S.. 100, 118-20 & n.3 (1941) (collecting cases) ; Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
However, the simplicity of this dual test belies the real problem. State courts have
often held that an explicit, clear or obvious congressional intent to pre-empt is necessary
to void state law. McQuay, Inc. v. United Automobile Workers, CIO, 245 Minn. 274,
281-82, 72 N.W.2d 81, 86 (1955) ; People v. Knapp, 4 Misc. 2d 449, 157 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y.
County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956) ; Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 539, 112 A.2d 379,
383 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. DiMeglio, 179 Pa. Super. 472, 117 A.2d 767 (1955) ; First
Nat'l Say. Foundation v. Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 138, 80 N.W.2d 249, 261 (1956). This view
has pervaded many Supreme Court opinions. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733
(1949) ; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), 27 MINN. L. REV. 468; Apex Hosiery Co.
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requisite breadth and federal concern,32 the Supreme Court has differentiated
the thrust of section 605 from that of the remainder of the act.33 Accordingly,
the act's general pre-emptive effect need not be imputed to the wiretap section. 34
Evaluated independently, the area of wiretap control does not reveal a federal
interest so dominant as to exclude state action which does not derogate from
congressional proscriptions. The federal courts have held that section 605 was
designed to protect the integrity of communications systems rather than the
privacy of communicants. 35 Communications systems, inevitably geared to in-
terstate commerce, are obviously a subject of paramount federal interest.3 6
But the primary effect of the Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes is to extend
to individuals a measure of privacy unattained under the federal act.3 7 Since
security from wiretap interference is not guaranteed by the United States
Constitution,38 protecting citizens from invasions considered unwarranted
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The
Apex Cases, 50 YALE L.J. 787 (1941) ; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261
(1929); cf. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498,
508-10 (1942). But since congressional intent to pre-empt is rarely stated explicitly, the
extent of the regulatory measure, see Parker v. Brown, supra at 363; California v. Thomp-
son, 313 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1941), and the public need for uniformity, Garner v. Teamsters
Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1953) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S.
439, 446 (1915), become crucial. Nevertheless, California v. Zook, supra at 732-33, criticizes
findings of pre-emption in the absence of specifically announced legislative intent. See also
PUC v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 446, 454 (1958) (dissenting opinion). For a discussion
of the theory and case law of pre-emption, see Note, 60 HARV. L. Rv. 262 (1946);
Powell, supra note 21.
32. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104 & n.14 (1957) ; NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943), afirming 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (Communications Act
pre-empts the field of radio broadcasting regulation) ; Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v.
Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (Communications
Act pre-empts interstate television regulation) ; McCaw v. Commissioner, 40 Hawaii 121
(Hawaii Cir. 1953) ; cf. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
33. See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
34. Ibid. The Court found § 605 equally applicable to intrastate and interstate com-
munications, while recognizing that the body of the act comprehended only interstate and
foreign communications. This finding, based on the more inclusive language of § 605, may
allow a similar differentiation of that section from the rest of the act for purposes of
assessing pre-emptive effect. See also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) (Con-
gress did not intend § 605 to supersede state rules of evidence).
35. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942) ; Diamond v. United States,
108 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1938) ; see Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 110 (1957).
36. See cases cited note 35 supra.
37. "We considered the passage of the wiretap bill a great victory for civil liber-
ties .... Pennsylvania has always admitted illegally obtained evidence. One of the pur-
poses of this act was to exclude such evidence from the state courts." Letter from Lois
G. Forer, Deputy Att'y Gen. of Pennsylvania, to the Yale Law Journal, March 7, 1958,
on file in Yale Law Library. See also American Civil Liberties Union Weekly Bulletin,
No. 1918, Oct. 7, 1957, p. 2; N.Y. Times, May 21, 1958, § L, p. 30, cols. 5-6.
38. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For discussion of Ohnstead,
see Notes, 38 YALE L.J. 77 (1928), 27 MIcH. L. Rv. 78 (1928), 27 MIcH. L. REv. 927
(1929), 77 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1928), 65 U. S.L. REv. 56 (1931), 15 VA. L. REv. 62
(1928).
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seems a proper area for state regulation.39 A contrary conclusion would posit
the apparent anomaly that the federal statutory aim of protecting communi-
cations systems prevents states, desiring to safeguard communicants, from
requiring of their officers less wiretap activity than that permitted federal
agents by Congress. 40
Even were section 605 to exclude the Pennsylvania and Illinois acts, the
states would not necessarily be foreclosed from adopting valid legislation of
similar effect. Within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states
retain exclusive authority to determine rules of evidence applicable in their
judicial systems.41 State legislatures may prohibit the use in court of evidence ob-
tained by wiretapping.4 Moreover, they may impose criminal liability upon state
officers for gathering evidence known to be inadmissible. For the concept of
federalism must at the very least permit each state to restrict the administra-
tive actions of its own officers. Admittedly, such state action, unlike the
Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes, would not reach federal officers and private
citizens. But civil suits vindicating state-created substantive rights are fre-
quently maintained in areas occupied by the federal government for regulatory
purposes so long as Congress has not furnished substitute federal actions.
43
Suits for defamation occurring on interstate television programs, for example,
are permitted although the Communications Act has been interpreted to ex-
39. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X. The police power is reserved to the states, United
States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.S.C. 1944), aff'd sub nom. Old Monastery Co. v.
United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) ; State v. Whit-
aker, 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E.2d 860 (1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; see United States
v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) ; United States v. Kesterson, 296 U.S. 299 (1935),
and is only limited by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, Eastman v.
Yellow Cab Co., 173 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950); see AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Public
health, safety and morals are proper subjects for exercise of the police power. Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); First Nat. Ben. Soc. v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.
Cal. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1946) (collecting cases).
40. Congressional intent to interfere with state penal laws will be honored only if
deliberate and unequivocal. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) ; Halter v. Iebraska,
205 US. 34 (1907); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120, 198 (1821).
Moreover, intent to exclude state action will not be presumed if federal authority
under a statute of wide potential application is infrequently exercised. See Atlantic C.L.
R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 294 (1914) ; cf. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
Federal prerogative under § 605 has only once been utilized. See note 2 supra.
41. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285 (1936) ; Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 599 (1904) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893); 1 WIGMoRE, Evm NcE § 6e (3d ed. 1940) (collecting
cases). But see Bepanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) (dictum); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199, 202 -(1952) (dictum); cf. Donnelly, Comments and Caveats, at 810 ni.60.
42. Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 41, at 202-03 (collecting state cases).
43. Regulation of interstate railroads has been pre-empted by the federal government
under the commerce power. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Yet
nonemployees regularly recover damages in state civil suits against interstate railroads.
See, e.g., Henry v. Pennsylvania R.R., 368 Pa. 596, 84 A.2d 675 (1951). See also Sher-
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elude state control of such broadcasts. 44 Consequently, those provisions of the
Pennsylvania and Illinois acts which define civil remedies for wiretapping
would be untouched by decisions holding the criminal proscriptions invalid. If
a civil remedy does not have a deterrent effect equivalent to that of a criminal
sanction, it would certainly provide more protection than the unenforced fed-
eral act.45 And while state circumvention cannot restrict wiretapping by
federal officers, even nonexcluded state acts may not be valid if so applied.46
Since wiretap control is a subject of continued debate and conflicting con-
clusions, 47 it appears a particularly appropriate field for local experimentation.
Axiomatic to a defense of wiretapping is the necessity of such activity to
effective law enforcement. 48 But the capacity of modern police to enforce the
laws without this aid has rarely been tested.49 Once construed or amended
to exempt federal officers acting in pursuit of federal law, the Pennsylvania
and Illinois statutes, if unhampered by needless constitutional obstructions,
may thus provide a basis for factual rather than hypothetical resolution of the
wiretapping dilemma.
lock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876) (pre-emptive congressional safety regulations on navi-
gable waters do not bar liability under a state wrongful-death statute).
But Congress can replace the local right of action with specific federal statutory
remedies precluding the local cause. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244
U.S. 147 (1917) (Federal Employer's Liability Act pre-empts cause of action under com-
parable state laws).
44. See, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.1S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1957)
(cause of action allowed for libel) ; Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (Communications Act pre-empts interstate
television regulation).
45. See note 2 supra.
46. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
47. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1958, § L, p. 58, col. 1; id. Dec. 15, 1957, § 4, p. 7, cols. 1-4;
Rosenzweig, supra note 2; Donnelly, Comments and Caveats. The number of congressional
attempts to amend § 605 testify to the controversial nature of the issue. See Westin, Analysis
and Proposal, at 180-81 nn.71 & 72.
48. See Rogers, supra note 1 (collecting authorities).
49. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761
(1952), noted that although wiretapping by federal agents was not countenanced by United
States Attorney Henry L. Stimson, his administration in the Southern District of New
York was eminently successful.
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